

Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000200160027-5

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Trends in Communist Media

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FBIS FOREIGN BROADCAST
INFORMATION SERVICE

Trends in Communist Media

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17 DECEMBER 1975
(VOL. XXVI, NO. 50)

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ANGOLA

MOSCOW RESPONDS TO U.S. CRITICISM OF SOVIET AID FOR ANGOLA

Soviet propaganda pegged to events in Angola continues to extol the successes of the pro-Moscow Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) and to vigorously condemn the MPLA's rivals for alleged collusion with South Africa to "invade" the newly independent People's Republic of Angola (PRA). For the most part, Soviet comment does not raise the possibility of a negotiated settlement of the conflict, although the existence of pressure for such a solution was acknowledged in a 4 December Kapskiy article in PRAVDA. Kapskiy cited the efforts of several countries in the Organization of African Unity to solve the question "politically" and observed that "hostile" activities by opponents of the MPLA made the prospect for negotiations "considerably more difficult."

Some commentaries seem to reflect Soviet sensitivity to statements in the past month by Secretary of State Kissinger and UN Ambassador Moynihan deploring Soviet involvement in the Angolan civil war. The propaganda has avoided directly acknowledging specific U.S. complaints about the substantial Soviet buildup of weapons in Angola, instead typically charging in general terms that the Western press had "distorted" Soviet policy toward Africa and that "imperialist circles" have accused the Soviet Union of "those aims which they themselves are pursuing in Angola."

Similarly, the Moscow media are not known to have reported Secretary Kissinger's 24 November warning, in his speech in Detroit, that Soviet intervention in Angola would "inevitably threaten other relationships." This view was countered, however, in a 2 December article by IZVESTIYA's observer Matveyev. "Some people," Matveyev complained, "would like us to believe that the process of easing tensions in the world and support for the national liberation struggle are incompatible things." Matveyev went on to assert the standard Soviet view that "the detente process does not mean--and has never meant--the freezing of the sociopolitical status quo in the world or the end of the people's anti-imperialist struggle for a better, just lot and against foreign interference and oppression."

Ambassador Moynihan drew more direct criticism, with TASS correspondent Romantsov, in an 11 December dispatch from New York, accusing him of "gross and slanderous anti-Soviet attacks" which had drawn Peking's support and which had been "firmly rejected" by African states. Beyond a reference to Moynihan charging "alleged 'Soviet interference,'" the dispatch provided no details of the ambassador's complaints over

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Moscow's actions. Romantsov cited Soviet UN delegate Malik's statement that "no stratagems" could compel the Soviet Union to end its "disinterested assistance" to liberation movements struggling for independence.

While affirming Soviet backing for the MPLA, Moscow media generally avoid acknowledging the nature of the Soviet assistance. Thus, for example, the 11 December Soviet-Yugoslav communique confirmed both sides' willingness to "continue giving support" to the PRA; and the 4 December Kapskiy article in PRAVDA typically noted that the USSR was giving "aid and support in these difficult days." Allusions to Soviet military aid to the MPLA have been very rare: a TASS report on Tanzanian President Nyerere's endorsement of the MPLA, published in PRAVDA on 4 December, noted Nyerere's remark that he was sure the Soviet Union would supply the MPLA with "all the necessary arms" for fighting. And an 11 December TASS report on MPLA President Neto's speech on the Movement's 19th anniversary reported his expression of gratitude to the Soviet Union for "all-round assistance . . . in repelling the aggression."

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obsolescence was also played up by Czechoslovak correspondent M. Kubin, writing in RUDE PRAVO on the 15th. Like Kiss, he noted that the U.S. Congress had already committed itself to "reassessing" the question of the approximately 7,000 U.S. nuclear weapons in central Europe. At any rate, Kubin wrote, the public has been insisting for years that these weapons be removed from Western Europe. Kubin went on to sarcastically question NATO's sincerity, recalling an article in the West German paper DIE WELT which asserted that the principle of reducing the conventional forces of the East while retaining Western supremacy in atomic weapons still seemed intact.

East German radio commentator Guenther Meisler also questioned the West's sincerity when he remarked on 8 December that the proposal was "by no means a concession by NATO." Inclusion of nuclear weapons, Meisler said, was merely a long overdue recognition of principles. East German commentator Guenther Leuschner, in a 15 December radio talk, seemed to be taking a more equivocal position when he said that only the "details, conditions and demands" of the proposal would show whether NATO was really beginning to reexamine the stance it had taken up to now in Vienna.

NATO

PEKING HAILS WEST'S RESOLVE, KISSINGER'S ROLE AT BRUSSELS

Peking's favorable reportage on the recent Brussels meetings of the NATO defense and foreign ministers seems to suggest greater Chinese confidence now--in contrast to one year ago--in what Peking portrays as growing Western determination and strategic resolve vis-a-vis the USSR, despite the attractions of detente with the Soviet Union. This change in Peking treatment comes against the backdrop of unusually blunt Chinese warnings about Soviet intentions in Europe ever since the convocation of last summer's Helsinki European security summit conference.

Peking NCNA reportage on the December 1974 NATO meetings had pessimistically characterized the Western states as preoccupied with internal economic difficulties and reluctant to increase defense spending. This pessimism was absent from Peking coverage of the current meetings, handled in two separate 12 December NCNA reports--one on the 9-10 December NATO defense ministers' sessions, and the other on the 11-12 December meetings of NATO foreign ministers. The latter report on the foreign ministers' meetings gave prominent play to remarks by Secretary Kissinger which criticized Soviet policy in Angola and which reaffirmed a resolute U.S. strategic posture in Europe against the USSR. This report marked the first time Peking has portrayed Kissinger in a strongly anti-Soviet role since 7 November, when an NCNA report on the firing of James Schlesinger as defense secretary had atypically depicted Kissinger as an overzealous advocate of detente with the USSR.*

NATO MEETINGS The NCNA report on the foreign ministers' meetings focused on the allies' agreement to strengthen unity and improve the efficiency of their military forces in the face of the growing power of Warsaw Pact forces. Peking pictured the NATO countries as undeterred by Soviet calls for detente, as determined

* Since the 7 November report, Peking has ignored a number of Kissinger statements critical of the USSR--especially over the stalled SALT negotiations--in contrast to the previous Chinese practice of playing up such pronouncements as evidence supporting Peking's view of growing U.S.-Soviet international "contention." For background, see the TRENDS of 12 November 1975, pages 1-2, and of 19 November 1975, page 24.

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to maintain defensive strength to fend off suspected Soviet "military aggression" and "political pressure," and as willing to compel Moscow to make concessions in the deadlocked MBFR negotiations in Vienna. The NCNA report on the defense ministers' sessions laid special stress on the so-called NATO "Eurogroup," noting favorably the efforts by these ten European members of NATO to standardize and modernize weaponry, and hailing the fact that their collective military budgets increased by over 5 billion dollars in 1975.

Peking noted that the NATO foreign ministers had discussed the situation in Angola, citing in particular Secretary Kissinger's condemnation of the USSR and his affirmation that the United States would not remain indifferent to Soviet supply efforts there and would not allow the USSR to get a foothold in the territory. The report also favorably replayed Kissinger's remarks to the press affirming that the U.S. relationship with Europe remained "absolutely central," that the United States was firmly committed to maintaining a strong defense in Europe, and that Washington would rebuff efforts to denuclearize all or part of Europe.

EARLIER PRC WARNINGS Prior to the NATO meetings, Peking, in an unusual series of media commentaries, had warned the West that the Brezhnev leadership was using the accords reached at the Helsinki summit to follow the path of Hitler after the 1938 Munich conference and to launch a "new stage" of pressures designed to squeeze greater concessions from the West. Peking media had labeled the CSCE summit as the "Munich of the 1970's." For example, NCNA departed from its usual coverage of Soviet policy toward West Europe to issue on 2, 8, and 10 December a series of lengthy articles by its correspondents abroad detailing recent Soviet military and political "expansionism" in the North Sea, Central Europe, and the Mediterranean.

Earlier, NCNA on 1 December went beyond its usual practice of giving only brief, straightforward accounts of visits by Western leaders to Moscow, to offer a lengthy commentary on the results of the visits to the USSR this fall by the Presidents of France, West Germany, and Italy. This commentary portrayed Brezhnev as more determined than ever to pursue Soviet expansion in West Europe in the wake of the Helsinki summit, but noted approvingly what it saw as a growing trend among Western leaders and in Western public opinion to "see through" Soviet detente posturings and to defend Western interests against "pressure" from the USSR.

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COMMUNIST RELATIONS

ZAGLADIN SEES NO IMMEDIATE PROSPECTS FOR WESTERN REVOLUTIONS

In a new contribution to the burgeoning communist debate over European communist party strategy, the first deputy chief of the International Department of the CPSU Central Committee, V.V. Zagladin, has sounded a note of moderation. Zagladin's views were laid down in a two-part article published in the journal QUESTIONS OF PHILOSOPHY, Numbers 10 and 11 for October and November 1975. Addressing himself to the esoterica of Leninist doctrine (the criteria for determining when a society is ready for socialism, and the criteria for determining when socialist revolution is feasible), Zagladin warned against confusing one with the other. "Revolution does not arise from every revolutionary situation," he warned, quoting Lenin. And by the same token, he noted, again quoting Lenin, "No rebellion will create socialism if it has not matured economically."

The key to successful communist strategy in these conditions, said Zagladin, is the "subjective factor," that is, the role of the communist party. Although Zagladin is less than explicit on this as on other points, he apparently means the communist party within the country concerned. This would put him on the moderate side of the current communist debate over strategy, since it would mean that the issue of whether an advanced capitalist country is ripe for revolution is one for the appropriate communist party to decide. Indeed, in referring to the "main task" of modern communism in West Europe and the United States at the present time, Zagladin stressed the importance of "taking into account the particular features of these regions of the world and these countries"--judgments clearly better made in the areas concerned than in Moscow. In a previous article in the September-October issue of THE WORKING CLASS AND THE MODERN WORLD, Zagladin had put a cloak of legitimacy on differences between ruling and nonruling communist parties, arguing that each "inevitably applies different methods" in its pursuit of the common goal.

Zagladin betrayed a slight tilt to the moderate side on other issues as well. On the question of the "objective" conditions for revolution in the capitalist world at the present time, he stressed the "complications" and "difficulties" that had been created by the development of state-monopoly capitalism. He said that the capitalist economies had acquired new possibilities for strengthening the positions of the bourgeoisie. Moreover, the working class itself had become highly differentiated so that it no longer shared a single class consciousness. As a result, he noted, even now support among the working class for "reformist" parties was increasing at a greater rate than for communist parties.

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On the issue of moderation versus militancy--whether the communist parties should content themselves (at least temporarily) with democratic goals or strive more directly for socialist goals--Zagladin is equivocal but seems to end up on the moderate side. He concludes that the immediate task for communist parties in capitalist societies is to form broad alliances with other parties for such partial goals as worker participation in management. It is notable that he cites Brezhnev on this point, quoting him as calling on communist parties to rally the people for democratic goals and to lead them to the "next stage."

Both in the two-part article in QUESTIONS OF PHILOSOPHY, as well as in his recent article in THE WORKING CLASS AND THE MODERN WORLD, Zagladin argued that detente provided a new situation which the communist parties must adjust to. He claimed that the situation offered new opportunities but also new dangers that the initiative would pass to defenders of the status quo, if communist parties failed to follow the right course in the new conditions. This stress on the importance of the "subjective factor" is the most noticeable link between the earlier article and the present ones.

Zagladin's recent articles have appeared not in the CPSU journals most commonly devoted to such subjects but in the ideologically less restrictive organs of the USSR Academy of Sciences' Institute of Philosophy and Institute of the International Workers' Movement.

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PRAGUE DEMAND FOR WORLD CONFERENCE SPARKS YUGOSLAV REBUTTALS

A new flareup of controversy between Prague and Belgrade over Moscow's reputed desire to convene a new world communist party conference was sparked by a 10 December article in Czechoslovakia's RUDE PRAVO which made a strong appeal for a world conference, a proposal the Yugoslav and other independently oriented communist parties have resolutely opposed. While Moscow has not itself publicly endorsed a new world conference, it has favorably replayed recommendations for such a conference by other communist parties, indicating that it at least wants to test the waters. Moscow has not yet publicized the contentious RUDE PRAVO article.

The article was probably especially repugnant to Belgrade because its call for a new world conference was keyed to the 15th anniversary of the 1960 Moscow conference of 81 communist parties, a conference which issued a statement explicitly denouncing "Yugoslav revisionism." Belgrade has been quick to respond to the Prague suggestion, with denunciations of the RUDE PRAVO article by POLITIKA's Prague correspondent and prominent Zagreb radio commentator Milika Sundic.

The current Soviet bloc strategy regarding a world party conference--letting Moscow's allies serve as its surrogate--was further demonstrated at the recent Polish party congress, where Polish party leader Gierek endorsed a world conference in his 8 December report to the congress, while Brezhnev failed to mention the topic in his speech to the congress the next day. The flareup of discord between Prague and Belgrade comes against a backdrop of controversy between pro-Moscow and independently oriented parties over the content of the final document that is being prepared for the proposed European communist parties conference, a controversy which has so far delayed the announcement of a date for convening the European conference.*

RUDE PRAVO ARTICLE Entitled "The Invincibility of Internationalism; 15 Years Since the Statement of the Conference of Representatives of Communist and Workers Parties," the 10 December RUDE PRAVO article by Zdenek Horeni took an uncompromising stance on the issue of international party consultations. After endorsing the proposed European CP conclave, the article declared that "our party also fully supports efforts for the convocation of a new worldwide conference" of communist and workers parties. It implicitly

* See the TRENDS of 26 November 1975, pages 1-5.

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rejected the view held by the independent parties that the document should express only generalities, saying that it should be "a truly militant communist document." The same militant stand had been taken in a 4 December Prague speech by hardlining CPCZ Presidium member and Secretary Bilak, who had headed the Prague delegation to the 17-19 November preparatory session in East Berlin. Bilak recalled that he had told that meeting that the European CP conference must issue "a communist document, a document of militant Marxist-Leninist parties."

Asserting that the Maoists had begun their disruptive activities even during the November 1960 Moscow conference itself, the article noted that they "had to renounce their errors" and sign the conference statement, even though it was in many respects "a devastating criticism of Maoism." The CCP's subsequent splitting activities, it added, proved that the Maoists were never interested in true interparty discussions.

With obvious reference to the independents' contention that "absent" parties--the Chinese--must not be criticized at international party conferences, the Horeni article asserted that the struggle against Maoism and its defeat have "now become an urgent combat task for the entire communist movement." Since Moscow is "the universally recognized vanguard" of the world movement, it continued, the combatting of anti-Sovietism is the international duty of communists, who "cannot remain neutral" in this struggle. In a further swipe at the independents, Horeni characterized such neutrality as in effect selling out internationalism in exchange for "cheap praise from the bourgeois viewpoint."

YUGOSLAV REACTION In a prompt rejoinder, TANJUG in Russian on the 12th reported a commentary by the Prague correspondent of the Belgrade POLITIKA which denounced the RUDE PRAVO article's call for a world conference as an appeal for "something which has become outmoded both as a concept and as a form of cooperation." Implicitly citing the 1960 conference's criticism of Yugoslav revisionism, the commentary contended that the anti-Yugoslav theses of "past conferences" had since been rejected by "a significant" number of other communist parties. Of the independent parties, the Belgrade representatives during the European CP conference preparations have been the most vocal in insisting that the planned European gathering must neither be a continuation of past conferences or a prelude to a new world conference.

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The outspoken Zagreb radio commentator Milika Sundic on the 15th assailed RUDE PRAVO for allegedly undoing all the progress achieved so far in the European CP conference preparations. In demanding a world conference and a militant European CP conference document, Sundic declared, the Prague article had broken agreements arrived at among the conference participants. The position spelled out by RUDE PRAVO, he added, would "inevitably" split the communist movement into two opposing camps--the pre-Moscow parties versus the other communist parties. The commentator deplored what he portrayed as an apparent revival of the Comintern and Cominform system of convening international conferences which serve the interests of "only a few" communist parties.

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USSR - YUGOSLAVIA

COMMUNIQUE ON MINIC VISIT SOFTPEDALS YUGOSLAV INDEPENDENCE

The communique on Yugoslav Foreign Minister Minic's 8-11 December visit to Moscow was noticeably less cordial than a similar joint document issued on Premier Bjedlic's visit last April, both in atmosphere and in the extent to which it reflected any Soviet acceptance of Yugoslavia's traditional independence. At the same time, the Belgrade media's favorable treatment of the visit suggests that Minic may have been satisfied with private assurances given him by the Soviet side on controversial issues.

The communique itself departed from the one on Bjedlic's April visit in characterizing the atmosphere of the present talks as one of friendship, mutual trust "and frankness," whereas the previous document made no mention of "frankness," a conventional communist codeword for discussions which reflect differences. Similarly, the current communique failed to repeat the earlier reference to "mutual respect and friendship between the peoples of the two countries" and provided no characterization of Minic's talks with Kosygin, while last April's document had described Bjedlic's talks with Brezhnev as "warm and comradely."

Suggesting that Moscow had taken a step backward in acknowledgment of Belgrade's independent position, the communique omitted the previous reference to the principles of "sovereignty, equality and independence." In addition, Belgrade again failed to get Moscow to affirm explicitly that their relations are based on the 1955 Belgrade Declaration, in which Moscow accepted the principle of different roads to socialism. As in previous communiques, the two sides this time settled on ambiguous language which can be interpreted both as reaffirming either the principles of the Belgrade Declaration or Moscow's position that relations are based on the 1971 joint statement, which qualified the earlier declaration by asserting the principle of "socialist internationalism." In another departure from the previous document, Moscow also withheld praise of the nonaligned movement.

The major positive factor registered in the communique appeared to be a willingness to continue talking out problems. Thus, the two sides agreed to solve bilateral problems "in a constructive spirit," to expand consultations, and to discuss CSCE issues.

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BELGRADE COMMENT Despite the communique's slighting treatment of Yugoslav independence, the Belgrade media have warmly welcomed the results of the visit. For example, the party weekly KOMUNIST, as reported by TANJUG's Russian-language service on the 15th, characterized the visit as a "confirmation" of "independent" Yugoslavia's long-term aspirations to develop friendly relations with Moscow and as an "important contribution to the cause of mutual understanding and cooperation." The apparent discrepancy between the Belgrade media's favorable reaction to the visit and the cool atmosphere and flaccid treatment accorded traditional Yugoslav principles of independence in the communique was explained by the Moscow correspondent of the authoritative daily BORBA. In a report on the 13th he pointed out that the communique did not quite reflect the totality of the visit. He wrote, for example, that the communique failed to mention that Minic's talks "confirmed" the Soviet position that Cominformist activities within Yugoslavia and other countries amounted to an "act of treason." Furthermore, he reported that the Soviet Foreign Ministry and high-ranking officials had "positively appraised" the growing role of the nonaligned countries.

The BORBA article, reported also by TANJUG's Russian-language service, and a pointed assertion by Minic on the 11th that the communique "faithfully reflects" the "unsatisfactory" results of his talks suggest that Belgrade was willing to accept a private repudiation of the Cominformists by Moscow while reserving its right to interpret the Soviet position in the Yugoslav media.

The one monitored Moscow radio comment on the results of the visit is not yet available.

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MIDDLE EAST

USSR PLAYS DOWN SECURITY COUNCIL DEBATE, URGES GENEVA TALKS

Moscow has remained lukewarm on the Syrian-promoted UN Security Council debate on a Mideast settlement, scheduled to begin 12 January, brushing it off with perfunctory references. By contrast, it has continued to press the Soviet Initiative--in its 9 November note to the United States--proposing resumption of the Geneva conference, which was again urged by Podgornyy in a 9 December speech in Afghanistan. Presumably with an eye to prospects for the Geneva talks, as well as the forthcoming Security Council debate, Moscow--without publicity--recently sent its Geneva conference representative, Vladimir Vinogradov, on a diplomatic mission to Syria, Jordan and Iraq to sound out Arab positions.

Not surprisingly, Moscow has continued to ignore signs that Syria and the Palestine Liberation Organization seem to prefer the United Nations to the Geneva conference as a forum for discussion of Mideast issues. Moscow has, of course, continued to criticize U.S. and Israeli opposition to PLO participation in Mideast negotiations, calling such opposition an "obstructionist" tactic to avoid the Geneva forum and delay a settlement.

UN DEBATE Soviet media have avoided the question of whether the UN Security Council might be viewed as an alternative forum to the Geneva conference--a notion Syria's President al-Asad explicitly presented in a recent TIME magazine interview carried by the SYRIAN ARAB NEWS AGENCY on 30 November. A view similar to al-Asad's was recently expressed by Zuhayr Muhsin, head of the PLO military department and leader of the Syrian-backed fedayeen group, as-Sa'iqah, in an interview with the Hamburg weekly DIE ZEIT published on the 12th and ignored by Moscow. Muhsin, responding to a question on the purpose of the 24-28 November visit by a PLO delegation to Moscow, said the talks dealt with the Soviet proposal to reconvene the Geneva conference and the Syrian proposal to involve the Security Council.* He said that the PLO delegation "tried to convince the Soviets that the Geneva conference has become

* The PLO delegation visit is discussed in the 3 December 1975 TRENDS, pages 10-12. Muhsin's remarks after a previous PLO delegation visit to Moscow on 23 April-5 May 1975, which reflected tension between Muhsin and PLO executive committee chairman Yasir 'Arafat, are discussed in the 7 May 1975 TRENDS, pages 15-16.

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unless to us, that new ways and mechanisms must be sought," but that the Soviets "hesitated to be a party to the Syrian initiative and to a comprehensive Mideast debate in the Security Council." Muhsin explained that Moscow's position was based on a belief that Soviet influence would be greater at Geneva, "in a small circle together with the Americans, without France, England, China, and all the others."

VINOGRADOV MISSION Vladimir Vinogradov's recent Mideast tour appeared to reflect Moscow's concern about Arab views and prospects for resumption of the Geneva conference. As with Vinogradov's last such mission in March, Soviet media have not mentioned the visit.* Arab media reports, however, have suggested that the Security Council session in January and the Geneva conference were topics of special interest in Syria and Jordan.

Reporting on Vinogradov's 3-5 December visit to Damascus, the SYRIAN ARAB NEWS AGENCY said on the 4th that his discussions with Foreign Minister Khaddam and other officials--President al-Asad was not mentioned--had included "anticipated developments following the recent UN Security Council resolution"--presumably Resolution 381 of 30 November, which extended the mandate for the UN Disengagement Observers Force on the Golan Heights and, in accord with a Syrian initiative, called for a Security Council discussion in January of the Mideast issue, including the Palestinian question. Amman radio added on the 6th that Vinogradov said in Damascus he had discussed "our common future move" to resolve the Mideast problem and that the USSR and Syria hold identical views "on many subjects and issues."

According to Amman, Vinogradov discussed "the possibilities for future political moves" with Jordan's prime minister and also met with King Husayn during his 5-9 December visit. The IRAQI NEWS AGENCY reported Vinogradov's arrival in Baghdad on the 9th, citing him as saying that his talks would concern bilateral relations and "the situation in the Arab area."

Moscow has had little to say about al-Asad's 9-11 December visit to Amman, waiting four days before issuing a TASS report on the joint Syrian-Jordanian statement on the visit. Although TASS noted that the statement called for a coordinated Arab stand at the Security Council debate in January, it ignored the statement's praise for Syria's "victory" in proposing and pressing for

* Vinogradov's previous visit to the Mideast is discussed in the TRENDS of 12 March 1975, page 6.

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Resolution 381, "which returned the entire issue to the Security Council on a clear basis, namely the UN resolutions which the enemy has continued to reject." The statement, broadcast by Damascus and Amman radios on the 11th, did not mention the Geneva conference. One Arab source, Amman's AR-RAY on the 9th, appeared to link Vinogradov's mission to al-Assad's meetings with King Husayn by predicting that the two leaders would discuss a Soviet Mideast peace initiative "which the USSR intends to announce soon" and adding that Vinogradov had met recently with both leaders.

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CAMBODIA

THIRD NATIONAL CONGRESS APPROVES NEW CONSTITUTION

Phnom Penh radio on 15 December broadcast a press communique announcing that the Third Cambodian National Congress had met in the capital on the 14th and approved a new constitution. The communique on the congress was broadcast in the form of a recorded message from RGNU Deputy Prime Minister Khieu Samphan and was preceded by brief introductory remarks read by RGNU Propaganda Minister Hu Nim. Phnom Penh media had not previously referred to preparations for the congress and thus far have offered no subsequent comment on the meeting or details of the constitution. Previous Cambodian congresses* have similarly been marked initially only by an official statement or press communique, only later drawing supporting comment in Cambodian media.

The 14 December communique stated that the Third National Congress was presided over by RGNU Prime Minister Penn Nouth and by Khieu Samphan. Khieu Samphan alone had chaired the previous Cambodian congresses, all of which were held in Cambodia while Penn Nouth was abroad. The press communique also made passing reference to Prince Norodom Sihanouk in his role as chief of state and Cambodian Front (NUFC) chairman, noting that he, along with Penn Nouth, had approved "various important points" in the constitution in late August 1975, when Khieu Samphan traveled to North Korea to invite Sihanouk to return home. Sihanouk, who did not attend any of the previous congresses either, has been touring East European, African, and Middle Eastern countries since 15 November.

The communique reported that the Third National Congress was attended by 1,115 participants, including "all the cabinet members who are in Phnom Penh" and representatives of workers, peasants, and Cambodian armed forces. Each of the previous congresses had roughly 300 participants, but were said to have had representatives from a wider array of institutional associations. For instance, the Special National Congress held last April reportedly included representatives of the Buddhist clergy and of "NUFC organizations," elements not explicitly noted to be present at the latest congress.

Indicating that preparations for the constitution had been underway for several months, the 14 December press communique revealed that the

* For discussion of the other congresses, see the TRENDS of 30 April 1975, pages 5-7, on the 25-27 April Special National Congress; of 5 March 1975, pages 1-3, on the 24-25 February 1975 Second National Congress; and of 25 July 1973, pages 1-2, on the 19-21 July 1973 First National Congress.

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constitution had been drafted by a committee established by the April 1975 Special Congress. The draft constitution was subsequently given approval by Sihanouk and Penn Nouth and submitted to "mass organizations" throughout the country which "exchanged views" on it. In the process, the constitution was said to have been redrafted four times before being submitted to the Third National Congress, which "unanimously and fully approved" it. The press communique gave little indication of the substance of the constitution, other than to report that its pronouncements were in accord with the appeal of the masses at the Special National Congress in April to set up a Cambodian regime that would establish an egalitarian, classless society and pursue an independent and nonaligned foreign policy.

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VIETNAM

SAIGON EDITORIALS AIR SOUTH'S PERSISTENT SECURITY PROBLEMS

Recent Saigon media accounts indicate that serious administrative and security problems continue to plague the new communist administration in South Vietnam, some seven months after the April takeover. Editorials in the NLFV newspaper GIAI PHONG, published in Saigon, have been explicit in their complaints of lawlessness and lack of security, citing problems of both overt and hidden opposition to communist rule.

An outspoken 29 November GIAI PHONG editorial--following perfunctory acknowledgment of the industry and devotion of administration cadres--bluntly admitted the existence of "quite a lot of deficiencies and shortcomings in the building and consolidation of the revolutionary administration." The editorial sharply attacked the "small number" of cadres who are "degenerate, corrupt" and who have "violated state laws" and "the people's right to ownership." In a more conciliatory vein, the editorial seemed to admit that the present difficulties also stemmed from a lack of cadre experience in dealing with problems characteristic of peacetime, thus observing that those "who previously used to fight and conduct troop proselyting activities are now still unfamiliar with economic, cultural, and social management."

To cope with this situation, the editorial invoked a warning contained in the resolution of the latest Vietnam Workers Party (VWP) Central Committee plenum, the 24th,* and reiterated by southern party Secretary and VWP Politburo member Pham Hung in his 15 November report to the Saigon political consultative conference on unification, to the effect that malefactors should be "dealt with severely and promptly." Quoting at length from the plenum resolution, the editorial also noted the need "to conduct regular inspections and positively rely on the masses . . . to weed out elements attempting to infiltrate into administration organizations."

* Apparently convoked after the communist takeover to decide the future course of the South, the 24th plenum was first noted in media coverage of DRV National Assembly Standing Committee Chairman Truong Chinh's 15 November report to the Saigon conference on unification. The conference and the plenum are discussed in the TRENDS of 19 November 1975, pages 17-18.

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The theme that regime opponents are still trying to subvert the present administration was developed in greater detail in a 4 December GIAI PHONG editorial entitled "Suppress the Counter-revolutionaries." Calling attention to the "host of problems" still hampering public order and political security in the South and stressing "the very complex, difficult, and time-consuming" nature of the "class struggle" there, the editorial of the 4th, with evident concern, told of the "deeply rooted intelligence-espionage apparatus" allegedly set up by the United States over the past 20 years. The editorial went on to claim that "numerous reactionaries, intelligence agents, spies, and counter-revolutionaries" were still operating and that they "have wormed their way into some organs of the administration" In an obvious reference to communist security forces, the editorial urged that the guidance of "the specialized branches" be used to cope with the dissidents and that their suppression should be accomplished without either "rightist or leftist deviations."

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RESOURCES FOR AGRICULTURE INCREASED IN NEW FIVE-YEAR PLAN

The figures contained in the USSR's draft tenth five-year plan published in the Soviet central press on 14 December indicate a considerable reallocation of resources from industry to agriculture in the wake of the 1975 agricultural disaster. State investments in agriculture are to total 115.7 billion rubles for the five-year plan period, 40 percent more than the 82.2 billion planned to be spent in the 1971-75 plan. Since the actual amount of state funds spent on agriculture in the 1971-75 period exceeded the planned figure slightly, amounting to about 83.6 billion rubles, the increase represented by the new five-year plan amounts to a little over 32 billion rubles.* The new plan sets remarkably high agricultural goals: average annual grain harvests of 215-220 million tons, compared with a goal of 195 million tons annually for the 1971-75 plan and the actual harvesting of only a little over 180 million tons per year, on the average.

Curiously, the big planned increase of investment in the new five-year plan is not reflected in the 1976 annual plan announced only two weeks earlier. Gosplan Chairman Baybakov, in his 2 December Supreme Soviet speech, reported that the state would invest 21.3 billion rubles in agriculture in 1976. This is only a half billion above what was invested during 1975 and an actual slowing down of the rate of increase in agricultural investment registered in recent years:

Planned State Investment in Agriculture

(in billion rubles)

1973	1974	1975	1976
16.4	18.4	20.8	21.3

Thus, almost all of the 32-billion increase in investments will have to come in the remaining four years of the plan. Likewise, the grain harvest goal announced by Baybakov for 1976 was much more modest than the goals in the five-year plan; he cited a 1976 goal of 14 percent above the 1971-75 average, i.e., only around 206 million tons.

* For background on agricultural investments, see the TRENDS of 16 April 1975, pages 22-25.

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In industry, the new five-year plan provides for much slower growth than before. The five-year industrial growth goal was set at only 35-39 percent, compared with 42-46 percent in the 1971-75 plan. This slowdown will be most notable in the consumer goods sector, with goals of only 30-32 percent growth versus the 44-48 percent called for--but not achieved--in the last five-year plan. Even in heavy industry the growth has been slightly cut, from a planned 41-45 percent in the 1971-75 plan to 38-42 percent in the new plan. Nevertheless, the new plan confirms the shift back to preferential growth of heavy industry signaled when the December 1974 CPSU plenum adopted a 1975 plan with light industry growth lower than that of heavy industry for the first time in several years.

As in agriculture, the 1976 annual plan for industry provides for little growth, suggesting that the economy will essentially mark time in 1976. Industry is planned to grow only 4.3 percent, versus 1975's 7.5 percent actual growth, obviously meaning that a strong showing in future years will be necessary to meet the five-year plan goals.

SUPREME SOVIET SPEAKERS PROTEST 1976 PLAN CUTBACKS

The tight 1976 annual plan and budget presented at the 2-4 December USSR Supreme Soviet session were greeted with a barrage of complaints by republic representatives, according to regional press versions of their speeches at the session. Although all formally endorsed the plan and budget--as they are expected to--spokesmen from virtually every republic protested parts of the plan and budget and appealed for more money or equipment for their local areas. Supreme Soviet sessions on the plan and budget often hear appeals for local projects, but the present chorus of demands appears to set a new standard in this regard.

While it is not surprising that the extremely low growth rates envisaged in the plan should provoke complaints from those affected, it is surprising that local representatives would dare to speak out so openly and bitterly. Moreover, virtually all these appeals for changes in the plan or for more money or equipment were deleted from the versions of the speeches published in the central press, even in the relatively long versions printed in IZVESTIYA. Only a few of the lesser appeals for more funds were mentioned in Gosplan Chairman Baybakov's concluding speech, and he replied in each instance that the funds provided were sufficient or that the questions raised were still under discussion.

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The speeches do not appear intended to reflect on Brezhnev or his leadership, since the complaints were more than counterbalanced by praise for Brezhnev. Moreover, many of the complainers were from republics controlled by close Brezhnev proteges (the Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Azerbaydzhan, etc.). On the other hand, virtually all the complaints mentioned Gosplan or the central ministries, suggesting that Kosygin may have been the ultimate political target. Coincidentally, Kosygin, for the first time since becoming premier in 1964, failed to attend the opening day's meeting of the Supreme Soviet session. Kosygin also failed to attend on 3 December, although he was reported meeting briefly with the Kuwaiti foreign minister on that day. He did attend the short 4 December final meeting which heard the brief closing speeches of Baybakov and Finance Minister Garbuzov.

LOCAL COMPLAINTS The most far-reaching and serious criticism was made by Ukrainian Deputy Premier and Gosplan Chairman P.A. Rozenko, half of whose speech, as published in the 4 December RADYANSKA UKRAINA, was devoted to complaints and appeals for more money. His main appeal was on behalf of the Ukrainian coal and metallurgy industries, whose growth, he contended, was being stymied by limits on investments. Stressing the national importance of Ukrainian coal and metal, he pleaded with the USSR Gosplan and central ministries to provide new equipment for Donetsk mines, to open new mines, and to provide for accelerated construction of metallurgical projects in the new five-year plan. He also appealed to Gosplan and the USSR Power and Electrification Ministry to aid the lagging construction of the Dnepr-Don Canal and urged diversion of some production funds to build more kindergartens and nurseries.

Estonian Premier V.I. Klauson declared flatly, according to the 5 December SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA, that the 1976 plan's growth rates for Estonian industry "do not satisfy us." He complained that Gosplan and the USSR Finance Ministry had already placed limits on the rights of local plants to use their own funds for their own development and that these limits were being continued in the 1976 plan. He also asked Gosplan to "raise the limits on building materials" provided for Estonian kolkhozes.

A Georgian representative accused Moscow, in effect, of reneging on recent promises of aid. According to the 4 December ZARYA VOSTOKA, M.A. Tsiskarishvili, head of a Georgian hydroelectric station construction administration, complained that while a 1974 CPSU Central Committee-Council of Ministers decree on Georgia had promised aid to Georgia's railroads and metallurgical, machine building, chemical, food and light industries under the 1976-80 plan, "preliminary discussion of the measures in union ministries and the USSR Gosplan" shows that these measures are in serious jeopardy, and he appealed to Gosplan and various ministries to implement the promised aid.

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Azerbaydzhani and Belorussian speakers protested cutbacks in housing and schools. Azerbaydzhani factory worker O.A. Bagirov, according to the 5 December BAKINSKIY PABOCHIY, stated that the 1976 plan had cut local housing construction to 330,000 square meters, as against 1975's 355,000, and provided for construction of only 27,300 rural school seats a year. He appealed to Gosplan to allot additional investments to build housing and rural schools in Azerbaydzhan, which he said suffered a severe shortage of both.

Belorussian Deputy Premier and Gosplan Chairman F.L. Kol'honov complained, according to SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA on 4 December, that central ministries had "sharply" cut investments for housing construction in Belorussia in the 1976 plan; he also attacked the USSR Agricultural Machine Building Ministry for eliminating funds to build vocational schools in the new plan. A Kazakh speaker, Karaganda miner Ya. Musagaliyev, according to the 5 December KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA, urgently appealed for Gosplan and the USSR Coal Ministry to reverse cutbacks in housing construction in Karaganda and also to deliver more equipment to the area.

Most speakers, including even those whose republics seem favored in the new investment plans, expressed fear that their republics would not develop fast enough under the 1976 and 1976-80 plans. According to the 5 December PRAVDA VOSTOKA, Uzbek Premier N.D. Khudayberdiyev urged Gosplan and central ministries to increase the planned growth of Uzbekistan's economy--especially its industry--to raise the production of Uzbek coal fields, and to increase delivery of agricultural equipment and pesticides to Uzbekistan. Kazakh Premier B.A. Ashimov, according to the 5 December KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA, asked Gosplan and central ministries to provide for a "significant increase" in production of equipment for Kazakh consumer goods industry and to provide more drilling equipment and pipe for the Kazakh oil and gas industry and more equipment for irrigation. Turkmen First Secretary M.G. Gapurov, in the 5 December TURKMENSKAYA ISKRA version of his speech, appealed for aid in construction of more plants, in building a canal, and in expanding electric power, and complained that the 1976 plan's reduced investments in the Chardzhou oil refinery--which was supposed to be completed in 1975--will mean that the project will not be finished even by 1980. Armenian First Deputy Premier G.A. Martirosyan, according to the 5 December KOMMUNIST, urged Gosplan and central ministries to accept local proposals to further develop Armenia's natural resources and to aid construction projects in the republic.

Even speakers from the RSFSR joined the chorus of appeals and complaints. Although long local versions of most of their speeches are not available, Baybakov's concluding comments indicated that RSFSR First Deputy Premier V.I. Vorotnikov had asked for more funds to build roads in the RSFSR. Baybakov likewise indicated that Moscow, Leningrad and Kuybyshev speakers had appealed for more money for subway construction in their cities.

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JOURNAL IMPLIES PARTY CRACKDOWN ON PHILOSOPHERS CONTINUING

The October issue of the journal QUESTIONS OF PHILOSOPHY has provided additional evidence of a crackdown on Soviet philosophers, implicitly called for by a 19 September PRAVDA editorial article criticizing shortcomings in philosophy. Reprinting and commenting on the 19 September article, QUESTIONS OF PHILOSOPHY confirmed that the PRAVDA article was based on special instructions recently issued by the CPSU Central Committee on the work of the Institute of Philosophy. These Central Committee instructions have not been published nor even announced previously, except for a vague statement in the 19 September article that "the Central Committee has defined the basic directions of the work of the Institute of Philosophy" The Central Committee action on philosophy, like the recent Central Committee intervention in the USSR Academy of Sciences, appears to reflect an accelerating campaign to reassert orthodoxy and refute any claims to autonomy in science advanced by the academy or by liberal philosophers.

The crackdown is apparently aimed at the Institute of Philosophy's organ, QUESTIONS OF PHILOSOPHY, which during 1973-74 was campaigning to place an expansive interpretation on dialectical materialism and party spirit, one which would not preclude the airing of unorthodox ideas.* This was implicitly acknowledged by the editors of QUESTIONS OF PHILOSOPHY, who declared in a note appended to the reprint of the PRAVDA article that it applied to them and that they would publish a series of articles on philosophy written "in the light of the Central Committee instructions." The liberal philosophers had apparently gone so far as to challenge the omni-competence of Marxism-Leninism and to assert an autonomous role for philosophy. This at least is the implication of the startling statement made by the head of Agitprop's sector for journals, N.B. Bikkenin, in the following, November issue of the journal. He said, apparently referring to views advanced by some liberal philosophers, that attempts had been made to draw "an impassable line between ideology and propaganda on the one hand, and science and information on the other, considering ideology as some sort of absolute antithesis of science."

* For background on the editorial article and on the journal's deviations, see the Supplementary Article "PRAVDA Editorial Article Attacks Shortcomings in Philosophy" in the 8 October 1975 TRENDS.

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NOTES

MOSCOW ON SPAIN: Moscow, in limited coverage of new Spanish governmental appointments, has appeared skeptical that any substantial movement toward "democratic transformation" would be forthcoming, but at the same time has noted the "liberal" reputation of some of Spain's new cabinet ministers. The retention of Arias Navarro as prime minister has shown, according to Moscow, that heralded plans for reorganization or even "some sort of reform" of the government were no more than "a reshuffle of the old ministerial group." TASS on the 12th noted that key ministerial positions had been filled by representatives of the "so-called" moderate right, center and monarchists. TASS betrayed some uncertainty in observing that the new interior minister, Fraga Iribarne, "is considered to be" a supporter of gradual liberal reforms, while the new foreign minister, Jose Maria Areilza, "is said to be" in favor of rapprochement with Western Europe and the resumption of relations with all countries, including the socialist states. Briefly reporting a declaration of the new government, TASS on the 16th said the government's program provided for "some changes" in existing state institutions and "widening of rights of political associations." Citing unnamed commentators, TASS added that the program envisaged steps toward closer Spanish ties with Western Europe and the Atlantic community. CPSU Politburo member Ponomarev--speaking at an 8 December ceremony honoring Spanish Communist Party Chairman Dolores Ibarruri on her 80th birthday--cautioned that the continued presence of foreign military bases in Spain and recent attempts by "certain aggressive circles" to draw Spain into NATO were not consonant with Spanish interests and peace in Europe. And IZVESTIYA's Polyanov, on Moscow radio's "international situation" program on the 12th, asserted that if efforts to bring Spain into NATO were balked by opposition of some NATO members, there were still the agreements on the U.S. bases which "enable the Pentagon to involve Spain in Atlantic strategy by the back door."

POLISH PARTY CONGRESS: The new Politburo announced at the end of the 8-12 December Polish United Workers Party congress reflected First Secretary Gierek's consolidation of the top leadership since the last party congress in December 1971. Gierek's chief rival, Frantisek Szlachcic, was dropped from the Politburo, while four Gierek proteges were promoted from candidate or secretary status, enlarging Politburo membership from 11 to 14. The recently named new State Planning Commission chairman, Tadeusz Wrzaszczyk, was elevated to Politburo candidate status. In an unusually extensive turnover, the PZPR Central Committee was enlarged from 115 to 140 members, with only about half of the former full members retained. The usual turnover

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In other East European party congresses has been about one-third. Szlachet was dropped from the Central Committee, as were former premier and president Cyrankiewicz and veteran conservative functionary Jedrychowski, whose careers had been in decline since Gomulka's ouster in December 1970. The resolutions adopted by the congress bore a strong pro-Moscow stamp in strongly endorsing CEMA economic integration, Warsaw Pact foreign policy coordination, and a European and a world communist party conference, and in denouncing the Peking Maoists as an obstacle to detente and to normal relations among the socialist countries.

PRC-ITALY: Peking gave a cordial, high-level welcome to former Italian Premier Amintore Fanfani, a staunch anti-communist and key leader in the ruling Italian Christian-Democratic party, during his 12-16 December visit to China. NCNA reported that Fanfani was feted at a Peking banquet on the 12th and that he held "friendly" talks on 13 and 15 December with Foreign Minister Chiao Kuan-hua and Vice Premier Teng Hsiao-ping respectively. This reception accords with Peking's high-level welcomes over the past two years for conservative political leaders from other major West European states, notably Edward Heath of Britain and Franz Josef Strauss of West Germany, and it underlines Peking's supportive interest in the Italian Christian-Democrats, a theme dating back to last summer when Chinese media began replaying favorably comment from the party's organ, IL POPOLO. Peking's support for Fanfani and the Christian-Democrats comes at a time when the ruling party faces its most serious challenge in decades from the Italian Communist Party. Though Chinese media have avoided explicit criticism of the Italian communists, recent Peking reports have generally criticized the major communist parties of West Europe as "pro-Soviet forces" exploited by Moscow to penetrate the West and subvert vigilance there against Soviet "expansionism."

CHINESE LEADERSHIP: NCNA on 16 December announced the death that day of Politburo member Kang Sheng, a vice chairman of the CCP who had been inactive for several years due to a prolonged illness. Kang last appeared publicly for National Day celebrations in 1974, when a surprise appearance in a wheelchair ended a three-year absence from public view. The obituary notice lauded Kang as one of the "outstanding" leaders of the party and the state, specifically noting that he "remained loyal to the party" during the cultural revolution, a period in which Kang, a specialist in intelligence and security work, joined the standing committee of the Politburo and served as adviser to the cultural revolution group under the CCP Central Committee. The namelist of the funeral committee for Kang, announced by NCNA on the 16th, included all full and alternate members of the Politburo listed in stroke order.

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A P P E N D I X

MOSCOW, PEKING BROADCAST STATISTICS 8 - 14 DECEMBER 1975

<u>Moscow (2474 items)</u>		<u>Peking (867 items)</u>	
7th Polish CP Congress	(--) 11%	URCA 30th Session	(7%) 5%
[Brezhnev Speech	(--) 4%]	USSR	(3%) 5%
CPSU Central Committee	(--) 6%	Laos People's	(10%) 5%
1976-1980 Draft		Democratic Republic	
Economic Plan		Established	
Podgorny in Afghanistan	(--) 5%	East Timor	(1%) 5%
China	(6%) 3%	Angola	(1%) 3%
Spanish CP Chairman	(--) 3%		
Ibarruri Awarded			
October Revolution			
Order			

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.